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Abstract—This paper proposes the notion of experience to
help situate agents in their environment, providing a link on how
the continually evolving environment impacts the evolution of
an agent’s BDI model and vice versa. Then, using the notion
of shared experience as a primitive construct, we develop a
novel formal model of shared intention which we believe more
adequately describes social behaviour than traditional BDI logics
that focus on individual agents. Whilst many philosophers have
argued that collective intentionality cannot always be equated to
the collection of the individual agents’ intentions, there has been
no AI model that addresses this issue. We believe this is the first
attempt to develop an explicit notion of shared experience from
an AI perspective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Existing models of BDI agents typically assume the agent
has its belief base already built [1]–[3]. This paper extends
such work by presenting an agent model that proposes the
notion of experience, which supports situating agents in their
environments and closes the BDI circle: an agent’s experience
in its environment impacts its beliefs, which in turn affect
its desires, then intentions, leading to new actions, and back
round again to new experiences. In other words, comparing
to existing BDI approaches, experience is proposed as part of
the missing link between the state of the environment and an
agent’s mental state.
After presenting the basic agent model, we then introduce
a logical formalism (X-BDI) to describe the agent reasoning
and whose semantics is grounded in the model. This formalism
delivers the main novelly of our proposal: defining the notion
of shared experience based upon the notion of individual
experience, and using this definition to address the issue of
collective intentionality. Following the intuitive assumption
that shared experiences and shared intentions provide the basis
of social behaviour,1 which is the foundation of multiagent
system research, we say we propose a model that provides the
necessary tools for reasoning over such social behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: we
start with a specification of the agent model, then we introduce
the logic for the experience-based BDI model, and follow it
with an example that illustrates the impact of this work. We
then close with some literature review and concluding remarks.
1We argue that if social behaviour was not based on shared experiences
and intentionality, then it would be the result of peers coincidentally acting
in a similar way, which is not the type of social behaviour that interests our
research work in multiagent systems.
II. THE AGENT MODEL
We argue that the physical world is populated with objects
(some of which may be labelled as agents) and changes
through events (where some subset may be labelled as actions
performed by agents). Here, our focus is not on the physical
world itself, but on how it is perceived by agents. It is
the perception of the agent situated in a given environment
that affects the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. More
precisely, we introduce the notion of experience, which is the
result of the agent perceiving its environment and forming
some conceptions about it. We argue that experiences shape
beliefs,2 beliefs influence desires, and desires drive intentions.
Intentions in turn lead the agent to act in its environment
(where the action could be as simple as to observe), which
results in the agent having new experiences. In other words,
we say that experience is the missing link that completes
the BDI cycle as it helps illustrate how the environment
impacts the evolution of an agent’s BDI and vice versa. This
section provides the basic definitions of experiences, beliefs,
desires, and intentions. We note that our proposal is based
on the assumption that an agent can perceive its environment,
resulting in having a set of percepts. Although we note that
percepts may sometimes be imagined (following the cognitive
neuroscience view that considers imagination as a second order
perception [5], [6]). As such, the set of agent α’s percepts is
referred to as Pα = Rα ∪ Iα, where percepts are either real
(R) or imagined (I). We also note that percepts, both real and
imagined, could describe various types of elements, amongst
these are percepts of agents (AG) and percepts of actions (AC).
A. Experiences
An experience is simply viewed here as a number of
percepts that the agent decides to group together. Experiences
may be basic (composed of percepts) or compound (composed
of a combination of percepts and other experiences). An
example of the former would be the sunset one witnessed.
An example of the latter would be going out, which contains
nested experiences such as having a drink, seeing a show, etc.
2The rich interplay between experiences and beliefs and how experiences
impact the formation of beliefs has been discussed in [4]. [4] argues why the
classical knowledge representation approaches that equate the set of beliefs to
the set of experiences is not expressive enough as it cannot describe what is
“not possible” or what is “possible for sure”, and it illustrates how experiences
may be used to modify beliefs, such as reassessing one’s generic beliefs when
an experience contradicting this generic belief is observed.
We enrich the definition of an experience (although these
may be considered complementary) by adopting Kant’s ar-
gument that the basic cognitive hard wired relationships are
time ordering (≺), causality (❀), and spatial (⊲⊳) relationships.
We also adopt Kant’s view that human beings follow the
categorical imperative method that makes them classify things
as good or bad. As such, we introduce the evaluation function
(♥) for evaluating experiences.
We state that the set of all experiences of agent α is Eα
(where the set of all experiences is referred to as E). A single
experience of agent α, Eα ∈ Eα, is defined as the tuple:
Eα = 〈P
′
α
∪ E ′
α
,≺,❀, ⊲⊳,♥〉
• P ′
α
∪E ′
α
describes the experience’s content (referenced
as content(Eα)), which may be composed of percepts
(P ′
α
⊆ Pα), sub experiences (E
′
α
⊆ Eα), or a
combination of both.
• ≺⊆ (P ′
α
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)× (P ′
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) defines a temporal partial
order over the elements of content(Eα).
• ❀⊆ (P ′
α
∪E ′
α
)×(P ′
α
∪E ′
α
) defines a causal relationship
over the elements of content(Eα), and it should satisfy
the property ❀⊆≺.
• ⊲⊳⊆ (P ′
α
∪ E ′
α
) × (P ′
α
∪ E ′
α
) × S defines
a spacial relationship between the elements of
content(Eα), and it should satisfy the property
(a, b, s) ∈⊲⊳⇒ (a, b) 6∈≺ ∧(b, a) 6∈≺. An example
of the set of spacial relationships could be S =
{above, below, left, right, behind, infront}.
• ♥ : L → V defines the experience’s evaluation, which
maps a label to an evaluation space. An example of an
evaluation space is V = {positive, negative}. The label
is intended to represent the evaluation criteria, such
as L = {impact, usefulness, contentment, surprise}.
The evaluation criteria may either represent rational
criteria, such as whether “the experience helps one
achieve their goals”, or emotional ones.
a) Basic Experience: We distinguish a special type of
experience, a basic experience Eα, in which all the contents
of the experience are single percepts: Eα = 〈P
′
α
,≺,❀, ⊲⊳,♥〉.
Agent α’s set of all basic experiences is referred to as Eα.
b) Basic Action: An interesting type of basic experience
is the basic action, which we define as a basic experience,
whose content contains only the percepts describing the
pre-conditions of the action, the action percept describing
the action itself (AC ∈ AC), and the percepts describing
the post-conditions of the action. The temporal relation then
states that all pre-condition percepts should precede the action
percept and that the action percept should precede all the
post-condition percepts. Additionally, the causal relation states
that the action percept leads to the post-condition percepts.
A basic action is then defined as a basic experience Eα that
satisfies the following properties:
1– ∀ x ∈ content(Eα) · (∃ y ∈ content(Eα) · x ≺ y ∨ y ≺ x)
2– ∀ x, y, z ∈ content(Eα) · x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z ⇒ y ∈ ACα
3– | ACα ∩ content(Eα) | = 1
4– ∀ x, y ∈ content(Eα) · x❀ y ⇒ x ∈ ACα ∧ y 6∈ ACα
B. Beliefs
SImilar to existing BDI models, we say an agent holds a
set of beliefs B about itself, its environment, its feelings (if
any), and so on.
C. Desires
We say desires D are experiences that one desires to
be realised in the environment. In other words, the percepts
composing these experiences are imagined ones, as they have
not yet happened or may never happen. For example, one
can desire to win the Nobel prize. A desire is then a basic
experience E such that content(E) ⊂ I, where I describes
the set of imagined percepts. We note that desires may or
may not be feasible. Furthermore, agents may or may not
commit to realising their desires; they usually attempt to realise
a subset of their desires. Desires that the agent commits to
realising through a concrete plan are called intentions, which
we introduce next.
D. Intentions
We say intentions are desires with plans: T = D × P,
where a plan is defined as a partial order of imagined basic
experiences: P ⊆ E×E . We note that basic experiences include
basic actions, and an imagined basic action is an action that
the agent has committed to realise but has not realised yet.
E. Agent Model
An agent model is then defined as the tuple:
〈P, E ,B,D, T 〉
where P is the agent’s set of all percepts, E its set of
experiences, B its set of beliefs, D its set of desires, and T its
set of intentions.
III. EXPERIENCE-BASED BDI LOGIC
We now define a BDI logic that is grounded on the notion
of experience which we will call X-BDI. We first define
its syntax, then we give its semantics based on the formal
definitions of the previous section, and finally present a sample
of the logic’s inference rules.
A. Syntax
• If ϕ is a propositional well formed formula then ϕ ∈
X-BDI
• If ϕ is a propositional well formed formula, α∈A is an
agent, and P is the set of plans, then Action(α, ϕ) ∈ P
• If ϕ ∈ X-BDI, α ∈ A is an agent, and p ∈ 2P is a plan
then E(α,ϕ), B(α, ϕ), D(α,ϕ), I(α,ϕ, p) ∈ X-BDI
• If ϕ ∈ X-BDI, G = {α, β, . . . } ⊆ A, and p ∈ 2P then
CE(G, ϕ), JE(G, ϕ), SE(G, ϕ, p),
CD(G, ϕ), JD(G, ϕ), SD(G, ϕ, p),
CI(G, ϕ, p), JI(G, ϕ, p), SI(G, ϕ, p) ∈ X-BDI
• If ϕ, ψ ∈ X-BDI then ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ X-BDI
The meaning of the symbols are as follows: G is a set of
agents describing a group (which we also refer to as an agent
community), Action has the obvious meaning, B, D, and I are
the classical BDI symbols, and E stands for Experience. We
use the letter C as a prefix to the E, B, D, and I symbols to
mean Common (i.e. what is common to all agents in a group);
J to mean Joint (i.e. what is common to all agents in a group
and all those agents are aware that it is common to all agents
in the group); and S to mean Shared (i.e. what is common to
all agents in a group, and all those agents are aware that it is
common to all agents in the group, and the shared belief literal
is related to the agents willingly acting together a shared plan).
Thus, the expression:
SI({α, β}, seeBCNplay, {Action(α, tv),Action(β, stadium)})
is a literal in X-BDI expressing (according to the following
semantics) that α and β have the shared intention to see
Barcelona play a football match by α planning to see the match
on tv and β going to the stadium.
B. Semantics
Formally, we understand the model of the world (which
is populated by agents) as a Kripke structure where the state
of the world and the mind state of agents evolve due to the
actions of agents. For instance, if ϕ is perceived by α (and
it becomes part of α’s experiences), then α may decide to
believe ϕ and we can say that the formula B(α,ϕ) is generated
in α’s belief base. Similarly, we can define the semantics of
formulae like D(α, ϕ). We say agents may have beliefs about
other agents, more concretely about the intentions, desires,
beliefs, and experiences of other agents. This means that we
give semantics to nested expressions. For instance, α may
have seen an agent β in the environment watching a football
match and jumping with joy when Barcelona scores a goal
and thus α deduces from that experience that β desires that
Barcelona wins, and that can be represented in the logic as
B(α,D(β,winBCN)).
Thus, given a set of agents {α, β, . . . }, we define an X-BDI
semantic model as a pair ω = 〈W,A〉 where W is a classical
logic model (i.e. interpretations for propositions) and A is a
vector of agent models A = 〈α, β, . . . 〉:
a) Propositions: The interpretation of classical formu-
lae is straightforward. We will use the symbol |=PL to refer to
classical satisfaction.
〈W,A〉 |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ PL and W |=PL ϕ
b) Actions: We say it is sufficient for one agent in the
community to have a percept of the action (even if the percept
is not shared by others) and that the world is consistent with
the changes in the environment caused by the action, for the
action to be considered true, or satisfied (recall that ACα is α’s
set of perceived actions). The satisfaction of a plan consists on
the satisfaction of each individual action in the plan.
〈W,A〉 |= Action(α, ϕ) iff ∃β ∈ A · (α, ϕ) ∈ ACβ
and 〈W,A〉 |= ϕ
〈W,A〉 |= p iff p ∈ 2P and ∀ a ∈ p · 〈W,A〉 |= a
c) Experiences: A model satisfies that α had an expe-
rience with content ϕ if it exists in α’s set of experiences Eα.
A group of agents had a common experience tagged as λ if
all had an experience that semantically entails λ. Similarly, a
group of agents had a joint experience tagged as λ if all had an
experience that semantically entails λ and they recognise each
other as part of the experience. Finally, a group of agents had
a shared experience tagged as λ if it was a joint experience,
they all actively participated in it, and the plan of action is said
to be satisfied (in other words, each action has been perceived
by at least one agent).3
〈W,A〉 |= E(α, ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Eα
〈W,A〉 |= CE(G, λ) iff
∀α ∈ G · ∃ϕ ∈ X-BDI
〈W,A〉 |= E(α, ϕ) ∧ ϕ→ λ
〈W,A〉 |= JE(G, λ) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · ∃ϕ ∈ X-BDI ·
〈W,A〉 |= E(α, ϕ) ∧ ϕ→ λ ∧ B(β,E(α, ϕ))
〈W,A〉 |= SE(G, λ, p) iff
〈W,A〉 |= JE(G, λ) and 〈W,A〉 |= p and
∀α ∈ G · ∃Action(α, ϕ) ∈ p · 〈W,A〉 |= ϕ→ λ
d) Beliefs: The semantics for beliefs is similar to ex-
periences. However, the notion of shared belief is defined to
exist when the agents in the group recognise one another in a
shared experience that led all of them to hold the belief.
〈W,A〉 |= B(α, ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Bα
〈W,A〉 |= CB(G, ϕ) iff
∀α ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= B(α, ϕ)
〈W,A〉 |= JB(G, ϕ) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= B(α, ϕ) ∧ B(β,B(α, ϕ))
〈W,A〉 |= SB(G, ϕ, p) iff
〈W,A〉 |= JB(G, ϕ) and
∃λ ∈ X-BDI · 〈W,A〉 |= SE(G, λ, p) ∧ λ→ ϕ
e) Desires: We use the same approach used for beliefs.
〈W,A〉 |= D(α, ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Dα
〈W,A〉 |= CD(G, ϕ) iff
∀α ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= D(α, ϕ)
〈W,A〉 |= JD(G, ϕ) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= D(α, ϕ) ∧ B(β,D(α, ϕ))
〈W,A〉 |= SD(G, ϕ, p) iff
〈W,A〉 |= JD(G, ϕ) and
∃λ ∈ X-BDI · 〈W,A〉 |= SE(G, λ, p) ∧ λ→ ϕ
f) Intentions: The intention of an agent to reach a goal
by following a plan is true if it is internalised in the intentions
of the agents. Common intentions and joint intentions follow
the same patterns as in the case of beliefs. However, a shared
intention requires each agent to intend part of the plan to
achieve the goal. That is, there is no shared intention if any
agent is not involved in fulfiling (at least) part of the plan for
achieving the goal.
〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, p) iff (ϕ, p) ∈ Iα
〈W,A〉 |= CI(G, ϕ, p) iff
∀α ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, p)
〈W,A〉 |= JI(G, ϕ, p) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, p) ∧ B(β, I(α, ϕ, p))
〈W,A〉 |= SI(G, ϕ, p) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · ∃ pα ⊂ p · pα 6= ∅ ∧
〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, pα) ∧ B(β, I(α, ϕ, pα))
3For simplification, we abuse notation and write a ∈ p to mean that action
a is ‘part’ of plan p and p′ ⊆ p to mean that plan p′ is ‘part’ of plan p.
C. Inference
We assume classical propositional deduction for propo-
sitional fragments of X-BDI and modus ponens on the X-
BDI formulae. X-BDI axioms are those of propositional logic
plus specific axioms for X-BDI expressions. Due to space
limitations, here we include axioms for Desires only:
⊢ D(α, ϕ) ∧ D(β, ϕ) ↔ CD({α, β}, ϕ) (1)
⊢ CD(G, ϕ) ∧ D(β, ϕ) ↔ CD(G ∪ {β}, ϕ) (2)
⊢ JD(G, ϕ) → CD(G, ϕ) (3)
⊢ CD({α, β}, ϕ) ∧ B(α,D(β, ϕ)) ∧
B(β,D(α, ϕ)) ↔ JD({α, β}, ϕ) (4)
⊢ JD(G ∪ G′, ϕ) → JD(G, ϕ) ∧ JD(G′, ϕ) (5)
⊢ SD(G, ϕ, p) → JD(G, ϕ, p) (6)
⊢ JD(G, ϕ, p) ∧ SE(G, λ, p) ∧ (λ→ ϕ) →
SD(G, ϕ, p) (7)
IV. EXAMPLE
With the basic definitions we can now specify the exact
steps needed for intentional agents to achieve shared intentions
(and hence, shared experiences).
Motivating the Interest in a Shared Experience.: Agents
may have different motives for engaging in shared experiences,
for various reasons based on their own personal beliefs and
desires. In BDI models, agents’ actions are the result of their
intentions, which are a subset of desires that the agent has
chosen to realise. As such, the action of approaching other
agents could in many cases be the result of a desire of sharing
an experience with that agent.
Investigating & Realising a Joint Desire: When one
agent desires a shared experience with other agents, then it
will contact those agents to convince them to share its desire,
and eventually fulfil that desire. In multiagent systems, this
could be achieved through argumentation [7], or collaborative
planning [8]. This step describes the agent’s investigation of
whether a joint desire for achieving the shared experience may
be realised. If an agent believes that all other agents hold the
same desire and that they are aware of each one of them
holding that desire, then the agent will believe that there is
a joint desire to achieve the shared experience.
Investigating & Realising a Shared Intention: After
a joint desire is born, agents are then committed to finding
the plan of action for fulfilling the desired shared experience.
Argumentation (or argumentation-based negotiation) is usually
used here to make sure that all parties agree to who does what
and under what conditions. If an agent believes that all other
agents intend to execute their role in a given plan and that
they are all aware of each others’ intentions, then the agent
will believe that there is a shared intention for executing that
given plan.
Realising a Shared Experience: Agents are now com-
mitted to carrying out the actions of the plan that they are
responsible for. When the plan has been executed, the shared
experience is realised.
In what follows, we take the scenario of two agents that are
interested in the shared experience of buying a gift together.
Let us say the agents adopt the names of their human owners,
c for Carla and b for Bill, and they are interested in buying
a gift for Mary together (the desire to buy a gift for Mary is
referred to as g). In what follows, we describe what actions the
agents could perform based on their X-BDI, and the changes
resulting in their X-BDI for each action perceived occurring
in their environment.
1) Motivating the Interest in a Shared Experience. Say
Carla is interested in buying Mary a gift, but because
she cannot afford a gift on her own, she desires to
buy the gift with one of Mary’s friends (referred to
as MaryFriend). As such, her belief base includes:
D(c, SE({c,MaryFriend}, g, inanyway)) (i)
Note that inanyway refers to some plan of action that
has not been decided upon yet.
Bill desires to share any experience with Carla (re-
ferred to as anything), possibly because he is depen-
dent on her, or maybe he is secretly in love with her.
As such, Bill’s belief base includes:
D(b, SE({c, b}, anything, inanyway)) (ii)
2) Investigating & Realising a Joint Desire. In order
for Carla to fulfil her desire of finding a partner
for buying Mary a gift with (literal (i) in Carla’s
belief base), she contacts Mary’s friends, asking each
“Would you like to buy a gift for Mary with me?”
Bill replies with a “Yes” to fulfil his desire of sharing
any experience with Carla (literal (ii) in Bill’s belief
base). This exchange of information leads to Carla
adding the following to her belief base:
B(c,D(b, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))) (iii)
B(c,B(b,D(c, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))))
And deducing that:
B(c, JD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)))
Similarly, Bill modifies his belief base by adding:
B(b,D(c, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))) (iv)
B(b,B(c,D(b, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))))
And deducing that:
B(b, JD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)))
As such, the following now holds:
JD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)) (v)
Note that the joint desire for a shared experience
may be the result of differing individual desires. In
our example, Carla just needs someone to share her
expenses, whereas Bill just wants to do anything
jointly with Carla.
Also note that (v) is deduced from axiom (4),
the belief literals (iii) and (iv), and formula
CD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)), which in turn
is deduced from axiom (1) and belief literals (i)
and (ii).
All the deduced formulae that we mention in this
section are deduced in a similar straightforward
manner.
3) Investigating & Realising a Shared Intention. After
both agents agree that there is a joint desire for buying
the gift together, they go on to argue on the details
of the plan they will follow. For example, where to
buy the gift? What to buy? In this paper, we do
not dwell on the details of how a plan is agreed
upon. Assuming both agents agree on a plan p, and
they both communicate their agreement to each other,
then Carla’s belief base is updated to contain the
following:
I(c, SE({c, b}, g, p), pc)
B(c, I(b, SE({c, b}, g, p), pb))
B(c, pc ⊂ p ∧ pc 6= ∅ ∧ pb ⊂ p ∧ pb 6= ∅)
And Carla deduces:
B(c, SI({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, p), p))
Note that pc is Carla’s part of the plan and pb is
Bill’s part of the plan.
Similarly, Bill’s belief base is updated by adding:
I(b, SE({c, b}, g, p), pb)
B(b, I(c, SE({c, b}, g, p), pc))
B(b, pc ⊂ p ∧ pc 6= ∅ ∧ pb ⊂ p ∧ pb 6= ∅)
And Bill deduces:
B(b, SI({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, p), p))
As such, the following now holds:
SI({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, p), p)
Note that each agent commits to performing its own
part of the plan (in this case, pc and pb) to make
sure the plan is realised, and both agents believe that
this plan will realise their shared experience.
4) Realising a Shared Experience. After executing their
actions and the plan is fulfilled, if the agents can
perceive that the plan has been fulfilled, then Carla’s
belief base is updated to contain the following:
B(c, SE({c, b}, g, p))
Similarly, Bill’s belief base is updated by adding:
B(b, SE({c, b}, g, p))
And the shared experience is said to have been
realised:
SE({c, b}, g, p)
V. BACKGROUND
The literature on BDI is vast. However, since the original
proposal by Bratman [9], most work has concentrated on
providing agent-oriented programming languages based on
BDI concepts such as Jason [2], Jack [3], AgentSpeak [1], [10],
3APL [11] or 2APL [12]; and on logical approaches to the
BDI model such as modal logic [13], first-order logic [10], or
degrees [14], [15]. Differently from existing work, we extend
the BDI model with the notion of experience, and use that
to introduce the notions of shared experiences and collective
intentionality.
Another related line of work with respect to the notion
of experience is Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) [16]. In CBR
certain types of (problem-solving) experiences are kept in
memory and recalled in order to be reused in the solution
of new problems. More importantly, the notion of a shared
experience is also not central in CBR; although federated
CBR [17] discusses a remotely related issue, which is the
communicability of knowledge and the coordination amongst
agents for acquiring new problem solving capabilities and
improving performance.
The main contribution of our work is on experiences
and shared intentionality. Individual actions are dictated by
individual intentions, which are the result of individual be-
liefs, and desires. But how do collective actions come about?
Philosophers, especially those interested in action theory, have
been more and more interested in the notion of collective
actions, intentionality, and belief. Since these issues have not
been addressed by current BDI approaches, we now discuss
existing philosophical views that have addressed these issues.
Some argue that collective attitude simply refers to the
fact that the majority of the group’s members share that
attitude [18]. These accounts were labelled as summative
accounts by Gilbert [19]. He argued the insufficiency of simple
summative accounts (SSA) and presented the complex summa-
tive accounts (CSA) as one approach to address some of their
problems by introducing the notion of common knowledge.
For example, a group G intends X if and only if most of the
members of G intend X and it is common knowledge in G
that most of the members of G intend X.
In our model, simple summative accounts are described by
common modalities. For example, a common experience is an
experience that has been experienced by the individuals of the
group. Complex summative accounts are described by joint
modalities. For example, a joint experience is an experience
that is common to a group, and the members of the group are
aware that they have all experienced the same experience.
Gilbert further argues that both the SSA and CSA accounts
are not the right approaches since a group’s attitude cannot
always be described in terms of the individual ones, even if it
was enhanced with common knowledge. For instance, a group
of people who are jogging in the park are aware of each other’s
intentions to jog; yet, there is something different between this
group and a group of friends who decide to jog together.
While our model does define common and joint modalities,
we note that these collective modalities are simply used to
describe the collection of individual modalities. They are not
used to describe the groups’ intentions as a whole. For that,
the shared modality is introduced. A shared experience is a
joint experience in which the agents are actively involved. A
shared intention is an intention shared by the group members
to carry out a predefined plan for fulfilling a joint desire.
Searle [20] states that the we-intend cannot be reduced to a
set of I-intend, even if it was supplemented with mutual beliefs.
He argues that collective intentions should combine the sense
of acting with the sense of willing something together. In our
model, the notion of shared experience does not necessarily
imply that the different agents sharing an experience were
willing to perform the actions they did together. However, the
shared intention is defined as having a shared plan, where each
agent intends to fulfil its part of the plan. The very definition
of an agent’s intention is its willingness and commitment to
execute the corresponding plan. As such, a shared intention
is realised only if the agents are willing and committing to
execute their actions as detailed by the plan agreed upon.
Bratman [21], like Searle, does not believe in a plural
agent (representing a group as a whole) that could hold shared
intentions, nor does he believe that shared intentions can be
reduced to individual intentional states. In his definition, an
intention is shared if and only if our intentional actions are
coordinated by making sure our personal plans of action meld
together. As such, shared intentions give rise to argumentation
and negotiation for agreeing on the coordinated plans of
actions. Bratman further argues, like Searle, that a single agent
can have a we-intention, which has attracted a great deal of
criticism [22], [23], since one cannot intend what he/she cannot
fulfil (in other words, one cannot intend actions that may only
be executed by others).
Similar to Bratman, we say an intention is shared only if
there is a shared plan of action that meshes and coordinates
individual actions, although the level of coordination remains
loose. For example, the plan may state who does what, without
going into the order or the pre and post conditions of actions.
Unlike Bratman and Searle, we say a shared intention cannot
be held by a single agent (although single agents may form
beliefs about shared intentions), but by the group of agents
whom the plan of action cannot be carried out without. Agents
can only intend to perform their part of a shared plan.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a formal agent model that intro-
duces the notion of experience, which situates agents in their
environment, providing a clear and tangible link that was
missing in past BDI approaches and that help describe how
the environment (and its changes) impact the evolution of an
agent’s BDI and vice versa.
We also built a logical formalism, the X-BDI, to describe
the agent’s reasoning and whose semantics are based on our
proposed agent model. The main novel contribution of this
work is defining, through the X-BDI logic, the notion of shared
experience and using it as a fundamental construct to underpin
collective intentionality, which we believe are the basis of
social behaviour and the foundation of multiagent systems in
general. While BDI was used as a model for individual agent
reasoning, X-BDI can be used (as our example illustrates) as
a model for collective agents’ reasoning by illustrating when,
why, and how do social interactions take place.
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